10 Ways to Tell
If Your President
Is a Dictator
By Stephen M. Walt | November 23, 2016
Just because the United States is a democracy now, it doesn’t mean it will stay that way.
There are good reasons to worry about how Donald Trump will handle
foreign policy, but there are also reasons to think he won’t be any
worse than some other administrations. The neoconservatives who
dominated foreign-policy making in George W. Bush’s administration had
lots of prior experience, God knows, and look at all the harm they did.
My fears about Trump’s foreign policy have always been two-fold: that he
might pursue a more sensible grand strategy but do it incompetently,
thereby weakening America’s international position, or that he will
eventually get co-opted by the foreign-policy establishment and repeat
the Blob’s most familiar mistakes. Based on some of his early
appointments — like Islamaphobe Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn as national security advisor — we might even get the worst of both worlds: unrealistic goals pursued ineptly.
But if you live in the United States, what you should really worry about is the threat that Trump may pose to America’s constitutional order. His lengthy business career suggests he is a vindictive man
who will go to extreme lengths to punish his opponents and will break a
promise in a heartbeat and without remorse. The 2016 campaign confirmed
that he has little respect for existing norms and rules — he refused to
release his tax returns, lied repeatedly, claimed the electoral and
political systems were “rigged” against him, threatened to jail his
opponent if he won, among other such violations — and revealed his deep
contempt for both his opponents and supporters. Nor does he regret any
of the revolting things he did or said during the campaign, because, as
he told the Wall Street Journal afterward, “I won.” For Trump, it seems, the ends really do justify the means.
To make matters worse, plenty of people in Trump’s camp appear to
believe America is now under siege from a coalition of liberal elites,
people of color, immigrants of all sorts, and shadowy foreign
influences. They also understand demography is not on their side: The
Republican Party has lost the popular vote in six of the last seven
presidential elections (Bush in 2004 was the exception), and the
percentage of older white Americans that forms the GOP base will
continue to decline. This situation will tempt some of them to use any
and all means to hang on to power, justified by their (mistaken) belief
that the country must be “saved” from all these alleged enemies.
Add to this mix Trump’s expressed admiration for “strong” leaders
like Vladimir Putin, along with the penumbra of extremist advisors he
has surrounded himself with, most notably white nationalist Steve
Bannon, and you have a recipe for undermining democracy over time.
Trump’s personal obsession with “winning” and his deep fear of
humiliation make me wonder how he will react when his approval ratings
sink, the bond market rebels, or when he isn’t able to deliver on his
promises. Every president has faced sharp swings in popularity —
this was true of Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, both
Bushes, Barack Obama, and even Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D.
Roosevelt. Trump will be no exception. But when his approval ratings
tank and even a Republican-controlled Congress refuses to give him
everything he wants, will he trim the sails and adjust — as normal
presidents do — or will he double down, lash out, and look for ways to
insulate himself?
Public accountability is inherent to America’s constitutional system,
but that doesn’t mean Trump won’t try to escape it. It’s not as if he
doesn’t have role models for this sort of operation. In Russia, Putin
has won a series of elections and retains high approval ratings, largely
because he has eliminated, intimidated, or marginalized anyone who
might challenge his control while feeding the Russian people a steady
diet of pro-Kremlin propaganda. Recep Tayyip Erdogan has done the same
thing in Turkey, in part by exploiting rural conservatism but also by strangling the press
and seizing every opportunity to arrest, threaten, coerce, or eliminate
opponents and critics. You can see similar formulas at work in Hungary
and in Poland, albeit to a lesser extent, and in the recently ended
reign of Italian media mogul Silvio Berlusconi, who kept getting elected
in Italy despite an abysmal record as prime minister and his own
checkered history as a sexual predator.
These fears may strike many of you as alarmist, and it’s entirely
possible that Trump will uphold his oath to defend the Constitution and
stay within legal lines. But given his past conduct, expressed
attitudes, and bomb-throwing advisors, I think there are valid reasons
to think the constitutional order that has prevailed in the United
States for more than two centuries could be in jeopardy. And that should
worry all Americans. The constitutional reality never lived up to the
Founding Fathers’ hopes and ideals, of course, but the system has had a
self-correcting quality that has served the nation well. Equally
important, the Constitution has helped the United States avoid the
self-destructive excesses and extreme injustices that are common in authoritarian countries.
To repeat: I am not saying this dark scenario of subverted democracy is likely, only that it is far from impossible.
Democracy has broken down in plenty of other countries, and there is no reason to think the United States is
completely immune from this danger. For a good rundown of the political
science literature on this topic, check out this useful list
by Jeff Colgan of Brown University. The good news is that the United
States doesn’t suffer from some of the traits that make democratic
breakdowns more likely: It isn’t poor, its political institutions have
been around for a long time, and it is not in the middle of a deep
economic crisis. The bad news is that the United States has a
presidential system (which appears to be more prone to this problem than
parliamentary orders) and also one where executive authority has grown
steadily over time. And we’ve never had a president remotely like this
one.
1. Systematic efforts to intimidate the media.
As George Orwell emphasized so powerfully in 1984, autocrats survive by controlling information. A free, energetic, vigilant, and adversarial press has long been understood to be an essential guarantee of democratic freedoms, because without it, the people in whose name leaders serve will be denied the information they need to assess what the politicians are doing. Trump sailed to the presidency on a The Top of lies and exaggerations, and there’s no reason to think he’ll discover a new commitment to the truth as president. The American people cannot properly judge his performance without accurate and independent information, and that’s where a free and adversarial press is indispensable. If the Trump administration begins to enact policies designed to restrict freedom of the press, or just intimidate media organizations from offering critical coverage, it will be a huge (or if you prefer, yuge) warning sign.
What sort of steps do I have in mind? For starters, Trump has already proposed “opening up” libel laws so that public figures can sue the press more easily. This step would force publishers and editors to worry about costly and damaging lawsuits even if they eventually win them, and it would be bound to have a chilling effect on their coverage. Or he could try to use the regulatory power of the Federal Communications Commission to harass media organizations that were consistently critical. He could go even further than Obama did in pursuing government whistleblowers and leakers and in prosecuting journalists who use confidential sources. His administration could deny access to entire news organizations like the New York Times if they were too critical of Trump’s policies or just too accurate in documenting his failures. Just because the First Amendment guarantees free speech doesn’t mean some parts of the media can’t be stampeded into pulling punches or once again indulging in “false equivalence.”
As George Orwell emphasized so powerfully in 1984, autocrats survive by controlling information. A free, energetic, vigilant, and adversarial press has long been understood to be an essential guarantee of democratic freedoms, because without it, the people in whose name leaders serve will be denied the information they need to assess what the politicians are doing. Trump sailed to the presidency on a The Top of lies and exaggerations, and there’s no reason to think he’ll discover a new commitment to the truth as president. The American people cannot properly judge his performance without accurate and independent information, and that’s where a free and adversarial press is indispensable. If the Trump administration begins to enact policies designed to restrict freedom of the press, or just intimidate media organizations from offering critical coverage, it will be a huge (or if you prefer, yuge) warning sign.
What sort of steps do I have in mind? For starters, Trump has already proposed “opening up” libel laws so that public figures can sue the press more easily. This step would force publishers and editors to worry about costly and damaging lawsuits even if they eventually win them, and it would be bound to have a chilling effect on their coverage. Or he could try to use the regulatory power of the Federal Communications Commission to harass media organizations that were consistently critical. He could go even further than Obama did in pursuing government whistleblowers and leakers and in prosecuting journalists who use confidential sources. His administration could deny access to entire news organizations like the New York Times if they were too critical of Trump’s policies or just too accurate in documenting his failures. Just because the First Amendment guarantees free speech doesn’t mean some parts of the media can’t be stampeded into pulling punches or once again indulging in “false equivalence.”
2. Building an official pro-Trump media network.
A second warning sign is a corollary of the first: While trying to
suppress critical media outlets, Trump could also use the presidency to
bolster media that offer him consistent support. Or he could even try to
create an official government news agency that would disseminate a
steady diet of pro-Trump coverage. As Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia
Group told a Harvard Kennedy School audience this month, if Putin can
have an outlet like RT, why wouldn’t Trump want something similar for
himself? In Trump’s ideal world, Americans would get their news from
some combination of Breitbart, Fox News, and the president’s own
Twitter feed, which would keep the public bamboozled and go a long way
toward insulating him from the consequences of his own mistakes.
Congress would probably refuse to fund a public broadcaster that was
reliably in Trump’s pocket, but if it did, look out.
3. Politicizing the civil service, military, National Guard, or the domestic security agencies.
One of the obstacles to a democratic breakdown is the government
bureaucracy, whose permanent members are insulated from political
pressure by existing civil service protections that make it hard to fire
senior officials without cause. But one can imagine the Trump
administration asking Congress to weaken those protections, portraying
this step as a blow against “big government” and a way to improve
government efficiency. I’ll bet the Wall Street Journal op-ed
page would be quick to endorse this idea, on the grounds that firing a
few senior bureaucrats would encourage the rest to work harder and
better. But if the president or his lieutenants can gut government
agencies more or less at will, the fear of being fired will lead many
experienced public servants to keep their heads down and kowtow to
whatever the president wants, no matter how ill-advised or illegal it
might be. And when you consider that Trump seems to be appointing
loyalists to top posts even when they lack the obvious qualifications
(Trump’s incoming chief of staff, Reince Priebus, has never worked in
the federal government), this possibility gets scarier still.
And don’t assume the military, FBI, National Guard, or the
intelligence agencies would be immune to this sort of interference.
Other presidents (or their appointees) have fired generals who
questioned their policy objectives, as Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld did during George W. Bush’s first administration when he
removed Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, who had the temerity to tell a
congressional committee that the occupation of Iraq was going to need a
lot more people than Rumsfeld had claimed. Other generals and admirals
got the message and stayed out of Rumsfeld’s way for the rest of his
disastrous tenure as defense secretary. There have also been fights in
the past over control of the National Guard,
but a move to assert greater federal authority over the guard would
give Trump a powerful tool to use against open expressions of dissent.
Because there are precedents for the various tactics I’ve just
described, some people might be inclined to give Trump a pass if he
moves in this direction. That would be a serious mistake.
4. Using government surveillance against domestic political opponents.
This step wouldn’t be entirely new either, insofar as Nixon once used the CIA to infiltrate anti-war organizations
during the Vietnam War. But the government’s capacity to monitor the
phones, emails, hard drives, and online activities of all Americans has
expanded enormously since the 1960s. And as Edward Snowden revealed a
few years ago, these activities still lack adequate oversight and have
sometimes broken the law.
As far as we know, however, no one has yet tried to use these new
powers of surveillance to monitor, intimidate, embarrass, deter, or
destroy political opponents. I don’t know if the exposure of the
indiscretions of former New York Gov. Eliot Spitzer or former CIA
Director David Petraeus is an example of this problem or not, but it
certainly demonstrates how an ambitious and unscrupulous president could
use the ability to monitor political opponents to great advantage. He
would need the cooperation of top officials and possibly many underlings
as well, but this only requires loyal confederates at the top and
compliant people below. The White House had sufficient authority, under
George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, to convince U.S. government employees to
torture other human beings. In comparison with that, convincing some
officials to monitor emails and phone calls and online searches in order
to dig up damaging dirt on the president’s rivals should be child’s
play.
5. Using state power to reward corporate backers and punish opponents.
A hallmark of corrupt quasi-democracies is the executive’s
willingness to use the power of the state to reward business leaders who
are loyal and to punish anyone who gets in the way. That’s how Putin
controls the “oligarchs” in Russia, and it is partly how Erdogan kept
amassing power and undermining opponents in Turkey. As Matthew Yglesias argues in Vox, that is also how Berlusconi operated in Italy, and it helped wreck the Italian economy and made endemic corruption even worse.
I know, I know: Corruption of this sort is already a problem here in
the Land of the Free —whether in the form of congressional pork or the
sweet deals former government officials arrange to become lobbyists once
they leave office — so why single out Trump? The problem is that
Trump’s record suggests he thinks this is the right way to do business:
You reward your friends, and you stick it to your enemies every chance
you get. So if the Washington Post runs a lot of critical articles about Trump, and Post owner
Jeff Bezos suddenly learns federal officials are contemplating new
regulations that would hurt his main business (Amazon), none of us
should be all that surprised. But we should be really, really worried.
6. Stacking the Supreme Court.
Trump will likely get the opportunity to appoint several Supreme
Court justices, and the choices he makes will be revealing. Does he pick
people who are personally loyal and beholden to him or opt for jurors
with independent standing and stellar qualifications? Does he pick
people whose views on hot-button issues such as abortion, gay marriage,
and campaign financing comport with his party’s, or does he go for
people who have an established view on the expansiveness of executive
power and are more likely to look the other way if he takes some of the
other steps I’ve already mentioned? And if it’s the latter, would the
Senate find the spine to say no?
7. Enforcing the law for only one side.
Effective liberal democracies depend on the rule of law being
implemented in a politically neutral fashion. That’s an ideal that no
society achieves completely, and there are many ways in which the U.S.
judicial system falls well short. But given the nature of Trump’s
campaign and the deep divisions within the United States at present, a
key litmus test for the president-elect is whether he will direct U.S.
officials to enforce similar standards of conduct on both his supporters
and his opponents. If anti-Trump protesters are beaten up by a band of
Trump’s fans, will the latter face prosecution as readily as if the
roles were reversed? Will local and federal justice agencies be as
vigilant in patrolling right-wing hate speech and threats of violence as
they are with similar actions that might emanate from the other side? I
don’t know about you, but I do not find the nomination of Jeff Sessions
for attorney general reassuring on this point. If Trump is quick to
call out his critics but gives racists, bigots, and homophobes a free
pass because they happen to like him, it would be another sign he is
trying to tilt the scales of justice in his favor.
8. Really rigging the system.
Back when he appeared likely to lose, Trump started telling audiences
that the system was “rigged” and threatened not to accept the outcome
if he lost. If anything, of course, the system turned out to be rigged
in his favor, insofar as he lost the popular vote and benefited from a
number of obvious efforts to suppress the vote in areas where support
for Hillary Clinton, his Democratic opponent, was high. Be that as it
may, given the promises he has made and the demography of the
electorate, Trump and the GOP have every incentive to use the next four
years to try to stack the electoral deck in their favor. Look for more
attempts to gerrymander safe seats for House Republicans and more
efforts to prevent likely Democratic voters from getting to the polls in
2018 and 2020. Needless to say, such interference is fundamentally at
odds with true democracy.
9. Fearmongering.
Stoking public fears about safety and well-being is a classic
autocratic tactic, designed to convince a frightened population to look
to the Leader
for protection. Trump played this card brilliantly in the campaign,
warning of “Mexican rapists,” foreign governments that “steal our jobs,”
“scores of recent migrants inside our borders charged with terrorism,”
and so on. He also hinted that his political rivals were somehow in
cahoots with these various “enemies.” A frightened population tends to
think first about its own safety, and forget about fundamental
liberties, and would be more likely to look the other way as a president
amassed greater power.
The worst case, of course, would be an Erdogan-like attempt to use a
terrorist attack or some other equally dramatic event as an excuse to
declare a “state of emergency” and to assume unprecedented executive
authority. Bush and Cheney used 9/11 to pass the Patriot Act, and Trump
could easily try to use some future incident as a — with apologies for
the pun — trumped-up excuse to further encroach on civil liberties,
press freedoms, and the other institutions that are central to
democracy.
10. Demonizing the opposition.
Trying to convince people that your domestic opponents are in league
with the nation’s enemies is one of the oldest tactics in politics, and
it has been part of Trump’s playbook ever since he stoked the “birther”
controversy over Obama’s citizenship. After he becomes president, will
he continue to question his opponents’ patriotism, accuse them of
supporting America’s opponents, and blame policy setbacks on dark
conspiracies among Democrats, liberals, Muslims, the Islamic State, “New
York financial elites,” or the other dog whistles so beloved by
right-wing media outlets like Breitbart? Will he follow the
suggestions of some of his supporters and demand that Americans from
certain parts of the world (read: Muslims) be required to “register” with the federal government?
Again, these are the same tactics Erdogan and Putin have used in
Turkey and Russia, respectively, to cement their own authority over time
by initiating a vicious cycle of social hostility. When groups within a
society are already somewhat suspicious of each other, extremists can
trigger a spiral of increasing hostility by attacking the perceived
internal enemy in the hope of provoking a harsh reaction. If the
attacked minority responds defensively, or its own hotheads lash out
violently, it will merely reinforce the first group’s fears and bolster a
rapid polarization. Extremists on both sides will try to “outbid” their
political opponents by portraying themselves as the most ardent and
effective defenders of their own group. In extreme cases, such as the
Balkan Wars in the 1990s or Iraq after 2003, the result is civil war.
Trump would be playing with fire if he tries to stay in power by
consistently sowing hatred against the “other,” but he did it in the campaign, and there’s no reason to believe he wouldn’t do it again.
This list of warning signs will no doubt strike some as overly
alarmist. As I said, it is possible — even likely — that Trump won’t try
any of these things (or at least not very seriously) and he might face
prompt and united opposition if he did. The checks and balances built
into America’s democratic system may be sufficiently robust to survive a
sustained challenge. Given the deep commitment to liberty that lies at
the heart of the American experiment, it is also possible the American
people would quickly detect any serious attempt to threaten the present
order and take immediate action to stop it.
The bottom line: I am by no means predicting the collapse of democracy in the United States under a President Donald J. Trump. What I am saying is that it is not impossible, and there are some clear warning signs to watch out for. Now, as always, the price of freedom is eternal vigilance. Or to use a more modern formulation: If you see something, say something.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.
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